The new threshold is set at a 5% decline of Tier 1 capital, replacing the previous level of 2.5%. The EBA plans to review and update the threshold regularly and may revise the methodology in the longer term. The NII SOT is an additional metric in the supervisory review of institutions’ exposures to interest rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB). The EBA states that a breach would not lead to automatic supervisory measures. Integrating the threshold into institutions’ internal systems would not necessarily require recalibration actions.

This increase in the threshold is not deemed sufficient, however, by the banking sector. According to Risk.net, the sector proposes a 7.5% limit. The EBA has calibrated the limit such that the number of banks violating the Economic Value of Equity (EVE) SOT should be similar as for the NII SOT. The sector claims that a 7.5% NII SOT will ensure this, as the original 2.5% was estimated in a low interest rate environment. The new threshold must still be approved by the European Commission (EC). Without this approval, the status of both the SOT for Economic Value of Equity (EVE) and NII is unclear.

Meanwhile, the European Central Bank (ECB) has started to analyse the unrealized losses that banks (could) face due to the recent interest rate movements. The ECB has requested banks to provide detailed information on their interest rate risk models and how they are affected by rising rates. The ECB states that it will use, among other, the results of the ongoing stress test to analyze the resilience of the banks.

In the broader context of banking supervision, the Financial Stability Institute (FSI) of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has highlighted the impact of rapid interest rate hikes on banks’ solvency and liquidity positions. Banks’ accounting choices, balance sheet characteristics, and business models play a role in how these effects are experienced. While Pillar 1 sets baseline requirements, rising interest rates and declining asset values expose vulnerabilities that require robust supervision under Pillar 2. Supervisors need to assess risks such as IRRBB and unsustainable business models. Market turmoil has emphasized the need for additional measures, both quantitative and qualitative, to address bank-specific vulnerabilities and enhance risk management. Implementing Pillar 2 consistently across jurisdictions is a challenge, however, that may require further guidance.

BNG Bank was founded more than 100 years ago – firstly under the name Gemeentelijke Credietbank – as a purchasing association with the main task of bundling the financing requirements of Dutch local authorities so that purchasing benefits could be obtained on capital markets. In 1922, the name was changed to Bank voor Nederlandsche Gemeenten and even today the main aim is, in essence, the same. What has changed is the role of local authorities, says John Reichardt, a member of the Board of BNG Bank. He explains: “Over the past few years they have diversified. Many of their responsibilities are now independent or even privatized. Hospitals, electricity boards and housing companies, for example, were in the hands of local authorities but now operate independently. They are, however, still our clients because they provide public services.”

Different to Other Banks

To satisfy the financing requirements of its clients, BNG Bank collects money on the international capital markets to realize ‘bundled’ purchasing benefits. “And we pass these benefits on to our customers,” says Reichardt. “While our customers have become more diverse over time, our product portfolio has widened. Some thirty years ago we became a bank, with a comprehensive banking license, and this meant we could take up short-term loans, make investments, and handle our customers’ payments. We try to be a full-service bank, but then only for services our customers need.”

The state holds half of the shares and the remainder belongs to local authorities and provinces/counties. “Because of this we always have the dilemma: should we go for more profit and more dividend, or should our strong purchasing position be reflected immediately in our prices by means of a moderate pricing strategy? Our goal is to be big in our market – we think we should keep 35 to 50 percent of the total outstanding debt on our balance sheet. We are not striving for maximum profit, and that differentiates us from many other banks. Although we are a private company, we do also feel we are a part of the government,” says Reichardt.

Changed Worlds

BNG Bank has only one branch in The Hague, with 300 employees. The bank has grown considerably, mainly over the past few years. As of the start of the financial crisis, a number of services from other parties have disappeared, so BNG Bank was often called upon to step in. Now, partly as a result of this, it has become one of the systematically important Dutch banks. “From a character point of view, we are more of a middle-sized company, but as far as the balance sheet is concerned, we are a large bank. We earn our money by buying cheaply, but also by trying to pass this on as cheaply as possible to our customers – with a small commission. This brings with it a strong focus on risk management, including managing our own assets and the associated risks. These are partly credit risks, but we have fewer risks than other banks – because, thanks to the government, our customers are usually very creditworthy.”

BNG Bank also runs certain interest rate risks that have to be controlled on a day-to-day basis. “We have done this in a certain way for a long time, but in the meantime the world has changed,” says Hans Noordam, head of risk management at BNG Bank. “So we thought it was time to give the method a face-lift to test whether we are doing it right, with the right instruments and whether we are looking at the right things? We also wanted someone else to take a good look at it.”

So BNG Bank concluded that the interest rate risk framework had to be revised. “Our approach once was state of the art but, as always with the dialectics of progress, we didn’t do enough ourselves to keep up with changes in that respect,” Reichardt explains. “When we looked at the whole management of interest rate risk, on the one hand it was about the departments involved, and on the other hand the measurement system – the instruments we used and everything associated with them used to produce information which enabled decision-making on our position strategy. That is a big project.

Project Harry

Over the past few years various developments have taken place in the area of market risk. When BNG Bank changed its products and methods, various changes also took place in the areas of risk management and valuation, including extra requirements from the regulator. “So we started a preliminary investigation and formed one unit within risk management,” says Reichardt. At the end of 2012, BNG Bank appointed Petra Danisevska as head of risk management/ALM (RM/ALM). “We agreed not to reinvent the wheel ourselves, but mainly to look closely at best market practices,” she says.

Zanders helped us with this. In May 2013 we started an investigation to find out which interest rate risks were present in the bank and where improvement levels could be made.

Petra Danisevska, Head of risk management/ALM (RM/ALM) at BNG Bank

Noordam explains that they agreed on suggested steps with the Asset Liability Committee (ALCO), which also provided input and expressed preferences. A plan was then made and the outlines sketched. To convert that into concrete actions, Noordam says that a project was initiated at the beginning of 2014: Project Harry. “This gets its name from BNG Bank’s location, also the home of a Dutch cartoon character, called Haagse Harry. He was the symbol of the whirlwind which was to whip through the bank,” says Noordam.

Within ALCO Limits

“During the (economic) crisis, all sorts of things happened which influenced the valuation of our balance sheet,” Reichardt explains. “They also had many effects on the measurement of our interest rate risk. We had to apply totally different curves – sometimes with very strange results. Our company is set up in a way that with our economic hedging and our hedge accounting, we can buy for X and pass it on to our customers for X plus a couple of basis points, which during the period of the loan reverts to us. We retain a small amount and on the basis of this pay out a dividend – our model is that simple. However, since the valuations were influenced by market changes, we were more or less obliged to take measures in order to stay within our ALCO limits. These measures, with respect to managing our interest position, would not have been realizable under our current philosophy; simply because they weren’t necessary. We knew we had to find a solution for that phenomenon in the project. After much discussion we were able to find a solution: to be more reliable within the technical framework of anticipating market movements which strongly influence valuation of financial instruments. In other words: the spread risk and the rate risk had to be separately measured and managed from one another. The world had changed and our interest rate risk management, as well as reporting and calculations based upon it, had to as well.”

After revision of the interest rate risk framework, as of the second half of 2015, all interest-rate risk measurements, their drivers and reporting were changed. The market risks as a result of the changes in interest rate curves, were then measured and reported on a daily basis by the RM/ALM department. “There is definitely better management of the interest rate risk; we generate more background data and create more possibilities to carry out analyses,” Danisevska explains. “We now have detailed figures that we couldn’t get before, with which we can show ALCO the risk and the accompanying, assumed return.”

More proactive

Noordam knew that Project Harry would involve a considerable effort. “The risk framework would inevitably suffer quite a lot. It had to be innovated on the basis of calculated conditions, while the implementation required a lot of internal resources and specific knowledge. Technical points had to be solved, while relationships had to be safeguarded; many elements with all sorts of expertise had to be integrated. The European Central Bank was stringent – that took up a lot of time and work. We had an asset quality review (AQR) and a stress test – that was completely new to us. Sometimes we were tempted to stay on known ground, but even during those periods we were able to carry on with the project. We rolled up our shirtsleeves and together we gained from the experience.”

Reichardt says: “It was a tough project for us, with complex subject matter and lots of different opinions. In total it took us seven quarters to complete. However, I think we have accomplished more than we expected at the beginning. With a combination of our own people and external expertise, we have managed to make up for lost ground. We have exchanged the rags for riches and we have been successful. Where do we stand now? As well as the required numbers, we have a clear view of what our thoughts are on ‘what is interest rate risk and what isn’t’. The only thing we still have to do is to fine-tune the roles: what can you expect from risk managers and risk takers, and how will they react to this? We will continue to monitor it. RM/ALM as a department is in any case a lot more proactive – that was an important goal for us. We can be more successful, but the department is really earning its spurs within the bank and that means profit for everyone.”